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What is true, will not change in the future (for some time, at least). Else, how could we
benefit from knowing the truth? However, is truth any nobler than “something that will
not change in the future”?
Let us start with the most fundamental philosophical position that is using a minimum
of metaphysical assumptions, the so-called (subtleties aside) methodological solipsism: I
have direct access only to my world of sensations; what is behind my sensations (and is
there anything at all), I cannot know that with absolute certainty. 
I will try to show how to convert this negative position into a positive philosophy of
demystified realism.
First, let us adopt an appropriate model of cognition – the following model-based model
of cognition (MBMC).
A model is anything that is (or could be) used, for some purpose, in place of something
else.  In  this  definition,  models  are  meant  to  be  concrete  systems  that  serve  as
replacements of concrete target systems (for some concrete purposes).
Models  are the ultimate goal of  cognition.  Humans and robots need models (in the
above sense) to manage what is happening in the world around them.
Hence, cognition should be assessed, first of all, as the production of models and means
of model-building.  Means of model-building can be further subdivided into theories,
methods, research programs, doctrines, paradigms, ontologies, logics, languages, etc. 
According to this definition,  the Standard Model of particle physics is not a model;
being a theory, it belongs to means of model-building. 
All the ideas contained in this definition were ready for use towards the end of 1980s.
They can be traced to Hestenes (1992), Rothenberg (1989), Cartwright (1983), Minsky
(1965),  Stachowiak (1965),  Apostel  (1960),  Craik  (1943),  Einstein  (1918),  Poincaré
(1904), Vaihinger (1876), etc. For most of references, see my (2009:  Towards Model-
Based Model of Cognition.  The Reasoner,  3(6),5–6) and (2014:  The Dappled World
Perspective Refined. The Reasoner, 8(1), 3–4). For the reference to Kenneth Craik, I'm
indebted to  Philip Johnson-Laird. The reference to David Hestenes (1992: Modeling
games in the Newtonian world. American Journal of Physics, 60(8), 732-748). 
These  ideas  can  be  found  also  in  the  work  of  the  actual  community  of  modeling
philosophers, see, for example, the volume (2009: M. Suárez (Ed.), Fictions in Science.
Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealizations).
How could one reconstruct the notion of truth in the above model of cognition?  How
could we recognize truth, if we only have models, means of model-building, and the
history of their evolution? Where is the truth in the cloud of models – with so many of
them already gone with the wind?
First  of  all,  truth  must  be  considered  not  as  a  property  of  propositions,  but  as  an
assessment applicable to knowledge constructs of any complexity – to entire models and
to  means  of  model-building.  Knowledge  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  heap  of  unrelated
propositions.
Secondly,  in  MBMC,  we  cannot  start  our  analysis  by  asking  about  truth  as  the
correspondence  between  models  and  “reality”.  Reality  is  itself  a  construct  used  in
model-building.
Thirdly,  after  so  many  cases  of  a  strongly  believed  knowledge  that  was  rejected
afterward, how can we hope to determine  in advance what exactly is “true” (will be
retained) and what is “false” (will be rejected) in our actual knowledge?
The fourth argument is due to Craik (1943: The Nature of Explanation,  Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, Ch. 5): 
“...  the model need not resemble the real object pictorially; Kelvin’s tide predictor, which consists of
pulleys on levers, does not resemble a tide in appearance, but it works in the same way in certain essential
respects...”
How big could  be the  “pulley on lever”  part  of  our  best  physical  theories?  Of  the
eleven-dimensional super-gravity, for example? 
And  finally,  is  anything  achieved by  qualifying  some  non-observable piece  of
knowledge  as  “approximately  true”?  Predictions  generated  by  a  model  may  be
approximately true, in a well-defined sense, indeed. But what can be derived from the
“approximate truth” of the model structure? Or, from the “approximate truth” of the
methods used to build the model?
However,  if  some knowledge  construct  really  “works”,  we may decide  to  continue
applying  it.  We  may  decide  even  to  try  extending  the  application  to  some  other
situations. In this way some knowledge constructs (models, means of model-building)
become more or less persistent  invariants of  the knowledge evolution.  It  is  this  re-
usability of knowledge constructs that inspires us to believe that these constructs are
“true”. But the real thing is the very phenomenon of invariance, and not the way how
people  categorize  it.  Truth  is  not  a  justified  belief,  on  the  contrary,  belief  is  an
unquestioned truth. (By the way, from this point of view, truths contained in the means
of model building are more valuable than truths contained in individual models.)
Thus, in MBMC, we can define truths as more or less persistent invariants of successful
evolution of models and means of model-building. What is true, will not change in the
future (for some time, at least).
Hans Vaihinger identified the following fundamental successful knowledge constructs
(he qualified them as fictions, of course): Kant's fiction of Ding an sich (i.e., the fiction
of independent reality), the fiction of thing-attributes, the fiction of whole-parts, and the
fiction of cause-effect. See Ch. XVII, XXV in Vaihinger (1911: Die Philosophie des Als
Ob, Reuther & Reichard, Berlin). Do we intend to continue using of these constructs in
our model building? If we intend, then we have here the first few truths to believe in: let
us think of our world of sensations as caused by an independent reality, and let us use
the concepts of thing-attributes, whole-parts and cause-effect for structuring it.
This approach to truth could be named demystified realism  (or, demystified theory of
truth)  –  the  kind  of  realism  based  on  a  minimum  of  metaphysical  assumptions.
(“Robotic realism” also would be appropriate, but the term is occupied already.)
Three great pragmatist thinkers have expressed similar opinions:
“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the
truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” C. S. Peirce (1878: How to Make Our Ideas
Clear. Popular Science Monthly, 12, 286-302)
“The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point
towards which we imagine that  all  our temporary truths will  some day converge.”  W. James (1907:
"Pragmatism's  Conception  of  Truth".  Lecture  6  in  Pragmatism:  A new  name  for  some  old  ways  of
thinking).
“Pragmatism denies the possibility of getting beyond the Sellarsian notion of “seeing how things hang
together”  –  which,  for  the  bookish  intellectual  of  recent  times,  means  seeing  how  all  the  various
vocabularies of all the various epochs and cultures hang together.”  R. Rorty (1982: Consequences of
Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980, p. XXXVIII)
What is achieved by this approach to truth? In particular, we obtain natural solutions to
the “world riddles”, for example, to the riddle of “approximate truth”. “How true” is the
idea of atoms? Do atoms really exist? Were Democritus, Dalton, Thomson, Bohr and
(is) the modern physics modeling the same phenomenon? There is a more productive
question to ask: will physicists continue using the idea of atoms in their model building?
They will, and this is the demystified sense in which “atoms really exist”. 
Any deviations from this (trivial?) approach seem to introduce portions of mystics –
they are creating the “world riddles” that remain unsolved for centuries. (Vaihinger was
right, oder? See Ch. VI, XXI.)
After adopting demystified realism, you will not need to change your beliefs. You only
should  not  try  to  obtain  an  absolutely  certain proof  that  some  of  your  beliefs  are
absolutely true.  This will  fail,  and then,  only one way will  remain how to obtain a
satisfaction – the way of mystification. (Thanks to Paulis Kikusts for asking the right
question.)
A possible “killer” question: isn't the above definition of truth trivial, indeed? What is
true, will not change in the future – what does that mean precisely? I will not change it?
My  community  will  not  change?  The  human  race  will  not?  And  how  long  must
something stay unchanged to become acknowledged as truth? Indeed, some truths will
persist only for some time, some – only for limited communities, but some – forever
and for all of the human race? Which ones? Do we really need to know that in advance
and with absolute certainty?
P. S. In Chapter 9 of Feynman's (1985: Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!: Adventures
of a Curious Character, with contributions by Ralph Leighton, W. W. Norton & Co) we
can read another demystifying argument:
“The electron is a theory that we use; it is so useful in understanding the way nature works that we can
almost call it real. … In the case of the brick, my next question was going to be, "What about the inside
of the brick?" – and I would then point out that no one has ever seen the inside of a brick. Every time you
break the brick, you only see the surface. That the brick has an inside is a simple theory which helps
us understand things better. The theory of electrons is analogous.” (my emphases)
